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HOME MORTGAGE LENDING: PAST, PRESENT,
AND FUTURE
JOSEPH A. SMITH, JR.
THE 2011 DONALD F. CLIFFORD, JR. DISTINGUISHED LECTURE
Dean Boger, Professor Wegner, Professor Broome, Mrs. Clifford,
my friends and colleagues. It is always a pleasure to participate in
the Festival of Legal Learning. It is a particular pleasure and a
profound honor this year to have been asked to give the lecture
named for one of the Festival's founders, Professor Donald F.
Clifford, Jr.
Don Clifford was a talented legal scholar and an exemplary human
being. Karl Llewellyn once wrote: "Technique without ideals may
be a menace, but ideals without technique are a mess; and to turn
ideals into effective vision, in matters of law, calls for passing those
ideals through a hard-headed screen of effective legal technique."
Don possessed both ideals and technique in abundance and
devoted himself to the development of a commercial law that
facilitates the provision of consumer credit in a fair and equitable
way. To honor him, I would like to discuss with you the interplay
of ideals and technique with regard to home mortgage lending.
. Joseph A. Smith, Jr. is the North Carolina Commissioner of Banks. The following is
a reprint of the 2011 Donald F. Clifford, Jr. Distinguished Lecture given by Comis-
sioner Smith on February 11, 2011. This lecture was held at the UNC School of Law
Festival of Legal Learning and was given in memory of a long-time UNC School of
Law faculty member and member of the Board of Advisor for the Center of Banking
and Finance, Donald F. Clifford, Jr. Professor Clifford's career is described in Lissa
L. Broome, In Remembrance: Donald F. Clifford, Jr., 13 N.C. BANKING INST. 1
(2009). This address expresses the personal views of the Commissioner and is not a
statement of policy of the Office of the North Carolina Commissioner of Banks or
the State of North Carolina.
1. Committee on Curriculum, 1944 AsSN. AM. L. SCHs. HANDBOOK 159, 161
(1944), reprinted in Comm. on Curriculum, Assn. Am. L. Schs., The Place of Skills in
Legal Education, 45 COLUM. L. REV. 345,346 (1945)).
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As everyone in this room is aware, we are still working through the
aftermath of a financial crisis brought on in substantial part by
improvident home mortgage lending, magnified through
structured finance and derivatives.2 This catastrophe is the result
of the co-option of the ideal of widespread home ownership in
service of breathtaking and ultimately self-destructive greed. We
are left with a great deal of cleaning up to do and a number of
practical and policy issues to resolve. I would like to take a few
steps back to review how we got here and then propose a few steps
forward on some of these issues.
There was a time, not so long ago, when home mortgage lending
was generally done by banks and thrifts and was governed by
prudence and the underwriting standards of the Fannie Mae and
Freddie Mac (the Enterprises). Having learned the lessons of the
thrift crisis, banks and thrifts originated mortgage loans and sold
them into the secondary market, particularly if they were fixed
rate instruments.
In those halcyon days, the tension between technique and ideals
was over access to credit, particularly in low and moderate income
and minority communities. Allegations of an unnecessary denial
of credit to such communities, in some cases outright red lining,
led to the enactment of the Community Reinvestment Act (CRA)
and the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act. Under those statutes,
banks, particularly those that wished to grow by mergers and
acquisitions, developed affordable housing programs to increase
mortgage lending in underserved markets.' The major policy issue
arising from bank originated affordable housing loans was whether
the CRA was mandating "credit rationing," the pricing of loans in
a way that did not reflect cost and risk. Progress on the access
front was slow and steady and there was a growing body of
2. See generally FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMMISSION, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS
INQUIRY REPORT, THE FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE
CAUSES OF THE FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC CRISIS IN THE UNITED STATES (2011),
available at http://www.fcic.gov/report.
3. The Community Reinvestment Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 2901-2908 (2006); see The
Home Mortgage Disclosure Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 2801-2810 (2006).
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evidence that affordable housing loans performed reasonably well,
at least relative to other subprime loans.
Then things changed. Advances in information and
communications technology, deregulation, and private capital
looking for yield converged, creating an alternative system of
housing finance that was market-driven and outside the traditional
institutional framework. During the mid-2000s, this private
market took a substantial share of mortgage lending, leaving the
government-sponsored entities (GSEs) (Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac
and Ginnie Mae) in relative decline. From an eighty percent share
of the mortgage backed securities market in 2001, the aggregate
share of the mortgage-backed market of the GSEs fell to fifty-four
percent in 2004, forty-five percent in 2005, and forty-four in 2006.'
The exponential growth of private label mortgage-backed
securities issued by Wall Street took a substantial share of the
market, based on a fee and volume driven origination and funding
system that, we now know, ignored the niceties of underwriting
and prudence, not to say honesty.
A number of states responded to the negative aspects of the new
subprime mortgage market with protective legislation-North
Carolina's anti-predatory lending statute being first and foremost.
For their trouble these states had to endure not only the aggressive
assertion of federal pre-emption by the regulators of national
banks and federal thrifts, but the argument that, although well
intended, their actions denied deserving low and moderate income
folks their chance at the American dream of home ownership. As
if that weren't enough, aggressive (for which read, effective)
statutes that dared to hold purchasers liable for non-compliant
4. Lei Ding et al., Risky Borrowers or Risky Mortgages: Disaggregating Effects
Using Propensity Score Models 34, (Univ. of N.C. Ctr. for Cmty. Capital, Working
Paper, 2010), available at
http://www.ccc.unc.eduldocuments/Risky.Disaggreg.5.17.10.pdf.
5. FEDERAL HOUSING FINANCE AGENCY, REPORT ON THE ENTERPRISES'
FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE 5 (2010), available at
http://www.fhfa.gov/webfiles/16591/ConservatorsRpt82610.pdf [hereinafter FHFA
CONSERVATOR'S REPORT].
6. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 24-1.1A-10.2 (2009).
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loans originated by others were subjected to the ultimate sanction:
censure by the rating agencies. This meant that investors would
not purchase the unrated mortgage-backed securities containing
such loans and, accordingly, capital markets would no longer fund
them, or would do so at prohibitive cost. In this "through the
looking glass world" both idealism and technique were turned
against those who stood against the march of the market. Access
to credit ceased to be a policy issue; fraud, flipping and foreclosure
came to the fore.
What followed has been well chronicled. The private issue
mortgage-backed securities market collapsed, taking with it Bear
Stearns, Lehman Brothers, Countrywide, WAMU, Wachovia and
others, and leaving behind assets of questionable quality on the
balance sheets of major financial institutions that survived the
meltdown, including the GSEs and the Federal Home Loan Banks.
As if this were not bad enough, the damage extended to the
Enterprises. Not to be outdone by Wall Street, Fannie Mae and
Freddie Mac ramped up their activities in the subprime and Alt-A7
markets in 2006 and 2007. Having emulated Wall Street, the
Enterprises got similar results, but with taxpayers on the hook for
losses. Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac were put into conservatorship
in 2008 and are currently on life support, notwithstanding which
fact the GSEs now account for over ninety percent of the
mortgage market.9 The foreclosure tide continues to run at a rapid
pace and the current and prospective inventory of unsold homes is
huge. Home mortgage credit is tight.
In a way, we are back where we started: home mortgage lending
tightly confined and institutionalized. Once again, the policy issue
is access to credit and it is a serious one.
7. Alt-A loans fall between the subprime and prime mortgage loans in terms of
their risk. What is an ALT A Loan? MORTGAGE REFERENCE LIBR.,
http://www.brokeroutpost.com/reference/149510.htm (last visited Feb. 12, 2011). Alt-
A loans include loans to borrowers with prime or close to prime credit scores but
lacking full (or any) documentation. Id.
8. See FHFA CONSERVATOR's REPORT supra note 6, at 5-6.
9. See FHFA CONSERVATOR'S REPORT supra note 6, at 5.
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Given our current circumstances, what are we to do? Restructure
our system of home mortgage finance to be fair, strong and
efficient. Legislation to achieve this objective will be taken up by
Congress in its current session. It will be hotly debated in no small
part because it involves a clash of ideals and of techniques needed
to achieve them. While I am chastened by recent personal
experience in our nation's capital, I persist in the belief that
common ground can be found to reform home mortgage finance.
In my view, a necessary first step is a reassessment of the nature of
home ownership and its place in our scheme of values.
Home ownership has a dual nature that has been a source of
confusion and harm. Not to be too obvious about it, home
ownership provides you with a place to live, what some experts call
"housing services."o If you don't own a home, you obtain housing
services by renting from someone else.
Home ownership is also commonly referred to as an investment,
and it is here that the confusion and harm begin. One view of the
return on a homeownership investment is related to the provision
of housing services. In this view, the financial return of
homeownership is the value of rent you don't have to pay, less
borrowing costs, taxes and maintenance. The investment value of
a home resembles that of an annuity: early payments in and return
obtained later, when the mortgage has been paid down or off and
you get the benefit of imputed rent.
Another view of the investment return of home ownership,
probably the more common one, is the price appreciation of a
house or, assuming it is mortgaged, the increase in home equity
after deducting applicable debt. This view equates home
ownership with an equity investment and treats the equity in a
10. Eric S. Belsky et al., Identifying, Managing and Mitigating Risks to Borrowers
in Changing Mortgage and Consumer Credit Markets 35, (Harv. Univ. Joint Ctr. for
Hous. Studies, Working Paper, 2008), available at
http://www.jchs.harvard.edulpublications/finance/understandingconsumer-credit/pa
pers/ucc08-14_belsky-case-smith.pdf [hereinafter Belsky et al.].
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home as a financial asset. Home equity viewed in this way
underpins a substantial number of personal financial statements
and the tax bases of most of our communities.
While neither of these views necessarily excludes the other, I
believe it is fair to say that our housing market has gone from an
emphasis on housing services to one where the idea of a house as a
financial asset predominates." This change mirrors changes in our
society. Our parents grew up in a world where it could reasonably
be expected that homeowners would live in a house for thirty
years, have a mortgage burning party, and retire with cash income
from a defined benefit pension plan and Social Security and
imputed income from the house. Our children and the younger
members of this audience live in a different world, where multiple
jobs in multiple locations are the norm, the duration of mortgages
averages about seven years, the defined benefit plan has become a
401(k) plan or nothing, and Social Security is less than a certainty.
In this brave new world, home equity has become the principal
financial asset of many households and, all too often, the source of
a crippling debt burden.12 I believe that consumer welfare is best
served by reversing this trend and returning the home to its
traditional function as a place to live and a store of long-term
value. Getting there from where we are now will take some doing.
One way to address the problems of the housing finance market is
to separate the housing services component of home ownership
from the risks associated with fluctuations in house prices and
home equity.13 Such a separation can be accomplished by a
transfer of ownership risk from borrower to lender or through risk
mitigation strategies that transfer such risks to the lender or a third
party. This is not as avant-garde as it sounds: there are a number
of examples of ownership transfer in the market today and risk
11. Id. at 3.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 35 (discussing use of the derivatives market to separate the cost of hous-
ing services (Hs) from the cost of housing as an investment vehicle (Hi)).
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mitigation for consumers is growing more likely as a housing-
related derivatives market develops.14
Ownership transfer is present in a spectrum of currently available
housing finance products. At one end of the spectrum is leasing,
where all ownership is in the landlord; however, the idea of "lease
to own" is under discussion as a possible tool to either keep
families in their homes after foreclosure or find new occupants for
such homes. "Soft second" mortgages, generally offered in
connection with affordable housing programs, have been a feature
of the mortgage market for a number of years. Shared
appreciation mortgages are being discussed as tools for
restructuring distressed loans and instruments to give first-time
homebuyers needed financing." Reverse mortgages are at the
other end of the spectrum; transferring ownership risk to the
lender and allowing the borrower/occupant to remain in the home
for little or no consideration until it is sold or the borrower dies.
In each of these instances, in varying degrees, consumers transfer
ownership risk and reward to their financiers in order to obtain or
continue to enjoy housing services.
A second and developing approach is to use derivatives - which by
their nature are intended to separate investment return from
physical ownership of goods - to hedge a homeowner's exposure
to the risks of the housing market or to separate physical
ownership from price fluctuations. In a 2008 paper for the
Harvard Joint Center for Housing Studies, Eric Belsky of the Joint
Center, Karl Case of Wellesley, and Susan Smith of Durham
University discussed how such an approach can reduce the
vulnerability of homeowners to a variety of risks. Among the
specific proposals contained in this paper were: (i) housing price-
linked savings products that enable home buyers to save for home
ownership in a way that protects them from being shut out of the
market through house price inflation; (ii) purchases of only the
14. See, e.g., id. at 35.
15. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L.
No. 111-203, § 406, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (amending 15 U.S.C. § 80b-11 (1940)).
16. See Belsky et al., supra note 11, at 35.
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housing services component of a home, "selling off" the
investment component and reducing the cost of purchase; (iii) a
house-price linked mortgage the repayments of which fall when
and if house prices falls; and (iv) SwapRent (SM), which separates
legal and economic ownership of housing in a way that allows a
sale of all or a portion of future appreciation of a house for a
current lump sum payment or income stream." Each of these
concepts is based on the use of housing linked derivatives. While
they are somewhat speculative, trading of such derivatives has
begun on the Chicago Board of Options Exchange, is developing
rapidly and makes them possible.
I do not believe that any of the approaches just mentioned is a
"silver bullet" for our housing woes; nor are any of the proposals
soon to be debated in Washington over the structure of the
housing finance system. Frankly, I don't believe any single
solution exists. Rather, the current problems of foreclosures,
shadow inventory, and tight credit, and the longer-term issues
regarding home ownership as a feature of the American social
contract have to be addressed one at a time, in light of the needs of
our citizens and communities. Starting now, we should seek to
apply all of the techniques available to us to make home
ownership available to those who choose it on a fair and
sustainable basis. Such a result is possible if all of us focus on the
ideals to be served by our application of technique: community,
stability, prudence, and thrift.
Success also requires that we stop viewing a house as a highly
leveraged bet on the real estate market or a status symbol. We
should put aside our house-proud ways and quit trying to borrow
our way to happiness, individually and collectively. At the very
least, we should stop subsidizing this kind of conduct.
The crisis through which we are now living has done substantial
damage to our financial system. It has also undermined public
17. See Belsky et al., supra note 11, at 35-36.
18. Id.
8 [Vol. 15
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confidence in our institutions and, worst of all, our ideals. The
concept of the American Dream, in which freedom and the
opportunity for self-fulfillment is widely available and expanding,
has been corrupted by cynical public relations and marketing to
limit it to the acquisition of material possessions with cheap and
illusory credit. Recovery and renewal of our nation require that
we address the fallout from the financial crisis, but technical fixes
will not suffice. Technique must serve renewed ideals based on
the inherent worth of each of us and the pursuit of genuine
freedom and community. By seeking to restore and refresh our
values, we will honor Don Clifford and people like him, who
coupled technical brilliance with a profound commitment to
others. I am strengthened by his memory and know you are too.

PERSPECTIVES ON THE DODD-FRANK WALL STREET
REFORM AND CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT:
INTRODUCTION
The North Carolina Banking Institute is excited to have
these contributions from five law school professors who have each
donated their time to present their perspective on the Dodd-Frank
Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act. The format of
each piece varies slightly, but they are generally short, to the point,
and not heavily footnoted. We hope, and believe, they will be
useful in helping readers understand this revolutionary legislation.
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